Part 1 : Operations

Background

The preceding four decades have seen the Indian commercial aviation industry blossom from a two-airline duopoly to a multi-player field,  and from barely 200 aircraft to nearly 850. However, the basic pilot training infrastructure, comprising the Flying Training Organisations (FTOs), has, until very recently, not grown in step with the accompanying rise in demand for pilots. Upto as recently as the mid-2010s, there were barely 25 small-to-medium-sized enterprises, with a total of approximately 100 vintage and well-used aircraft.

Fast forward to the early 2020s, when unprecedented airline expansion plans triggered a massive demand for pilots.     The FTO sector was invigorated by the government’s initiative of dovetailing it into the successfully ongoing Aatmanirbhar Bharat (Self-reliant India) Plan.  The outcome of these events was that 10-12 new FTOs have emerged in the last approximately  five years.  The number of training aircraft has crossed 300.   This represents an almost 40% increase in FTOs and a 200% increase in assets within roughly the same period, a remarkable achievement. 

However, there is a flip side to the story. This expanded capacity has been accompanied by a rise in accidents during training. The figures speak for themselves. Out of the 61 recorded aviation accidents in India between 2017 and 2023,  25, or just over 40%, occurred in FTOs, with 2022 (7 out of 12), being a particularly bad year.   On the average,  three training accidents occur  every year. In 2025, two have already occurred; one with fatal consequences near Amreli, Gujarat, on 22 Apr 2025,    and one with substantial damage to the aircraft around Dhanipur, near Aligarh, on 04 May 2025.   As elsewhere in aviation, Operational,  Maintenance, and Environmental factors, or any combination of these, have been (or, in all probability, will soon be revealed as)  the main causes.  

All this while, DGCA has not been idling. Recognising that increased numbers had to be accompanied by increased oversight, regulatory focus on FTO safety was substantially ramped up, and this was evident in the increase, as well as the stringency, of its FTO audits, both scheduled and surprise.  Periodical reports of FTOs being called to account for regulatory violations and non-adherence to safety protocols began to emerge in the media, with incremental penalties, from fines and warnings, to temporary shutdowns. Such regulatory initiatives, if pursued vigorously and consistently,  will surely bear fruit, but they have limitations. They are reactive and lack a coherent strategy, deadlines to implement corrective actions are often flexible, and the available regulatory manpower has too many responsibilities spread across a plethora of airlines, corporate aviation entities, and FTOs – all of which are in an expansion mode.  In the context of FTOs, shortcomings are indicated by the number of repetitive accidents, which continue to occur regularly. Some time ago, a large FTO chain was temporarily shut down after a series of mishaps. Another suffered several serious accidents in the last five years or so. Obviously, our safety oversight  at all levels needs a substantial boost, involving all stakeholders.  

The human element is central to aviation processes, which is why the umbrella term “Human Factors” was designated as a major cause of accidents. Under this category, low skill and experience levels of young pilot trainees have been, and continue to remain, well-known and well-documented reasons for accidents in FTOs.   Not so commonly known are several crucial but intangible features of the FTO industry, such as  its business models, the key people and their influence, complex internal relationships,  social and cultural hallmarks, and other human-machine-environment interactions, all of which have some bearing on safety metrics. This author will therefore attempt to explore the safety hazards in each of the three arenas - Operations,  Maintenance, and Environment - of FTOs, through the prism of Human Factors, and suggest ways to mitigate the existing, and even some future, risks.  The intent is purely curative. This, the first of a three-part study,  will examine Human Factors in Operations.

A Brief History of Flying Training in India

Before studying how Indian FTOs operate, it would be prudent to trace the history of flying training in India. Two organisations set up a few days apart in 1928 -  the Delhi Flying Club and the Bombay Flying Club -  are generally acknowledged to be the first pilot training institutes in India. The word “club” is significant; apart from suggesting elitism, it implies a sports facility. In fact, one of the stated objectives of a legacy aviation body, the Aero Club of India, which predates even the two mentioned above, was to “encourage flying as a sport and to create air-mindedness among the youth of the country.”   As a result, for many decades, all the pilot training establishments in the country were referred to as “flying clubs,” and some people and official documents still use the term. 

Commercial aviation was not a mainstream profession in India up to the mid-1990s. Prohibitively high training costs and limited employment opportunities were the major deterrents. Flying clubs, both government-backed and privately owned, existed at several locations, but their low numbers and correspondingly low output did not  constitute an industry.  However, these clubs did provide a narrow pipeline of pilots for the commercial aviation industry. In parallel, aspirants who could afford the costs went abroad for training.

Post the declaration of the Open Sky Policy in 1994, a host of new airlines and other aviation service providers came up, and employment opportunities mushroomed. However, the pilot training infrastructure, which had remained stagnant, could not absorb  the increased demand, which in turn led to a sharp rise in aspirants heading abroad for flying training. The US was a favoured destination, due to its plethora of flight schools (informally assessed as 1500, plus/minus a few hundred, as on date), the short time taken to complete the required flying syllabus, the competitive costs, and the opportunity for trainees to gain some international exposure. Then came other options such as the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, with a few people foraying into South Africa as well. 

By the mid-2000s, more domestic players had stepped in and set up several new FTOs. Many of the owners were people from a vast array of professions and businesses,  usually unconnected to aviation - a trend that endures. Very few of these enterprises survived, somewhat mirroring the fate of several start-up airlines in the 1990s and early 2000s. Subsequently, the boom-bust cycle of commercial aviation continued, and the last boom commenced in 2021-22, which led to another surge in FTO numbers. Presently, there are 38 of them.   The larger ones operate from multiple bases; as on date, 56 locations are in use.  It is understood that more FTOs are in the pipeline.

An Overview of the FTO Industry

An FTO is a niche service provider, offering the ground and flying training necessary for an aspirant to obtain a Commercial Pilot’s License (CPL), which is the basic qualification for a pilot in commercial aviation.  One could look at FTOs as the aviation industry’s equivalent of colleges in other disciplines and professions, with significant differences. Some generic facets of Indian  FTOs are described below. To provide a larger canvas, a comparison has been made with the US in some cases.

Location

Most Indian FTOs are located at relatively smaller “uncontrolled” airfields, some of World War II vintage, in remote areas. The reasons are rooted in history, but, in the present day, this practice is still followed for at least three very good reasons. Firstly, as commercial aviation has burgeoned in India, the larger or “controlled” airfields, where some legacy FTOs were based, have become busier, and the airspace around them has become increasingly congested. Operating eight or ten light, slow-moving training aircraft piloted by inexperienced trainees, in the midst of a constant flow of departing and arriving airliners, can be a stiff challenge for Air Traffic Controllers and pilots alike. Secondly, scheduled (airline) flights are always given priority over training aircraft, because of which a resident FTO has to operate within restricted timings. Thirdly, an FTO requires considerable real estate for its mandatory infrastructure, including a hangar and administrative buildings. The majority of controlled airfields are owned by the Airports’ Authority of India (AAI), which, up to fairly recently,  charged very high rentals, thus impacting the financial bottom line of any resident FTO.  Finally, remoteness is a double-edged sword that cuts across separate domains. On one hand, the lack of distractions encourages students to focus on learning;  on the other,  it is easier for the FTO to get away with violations of regulations and procedures.

Ownership and Size

Some of the largest US FTOs (termed “flight schools”) are run by universities, such as Embry Riddle (175 aircraft at two locations, and over 2000 students),  North Dakota (100 aircraft, and over 2400 students), as well as Florida Tech, Ohio State, and Purdue.  One US airline (United) runs its own flight school, while others partner with different schools to provide pathways for pilot trainees. Owners of flight schools are typically pilots or retired flight instructors.   US aircraft manufacturers, such as Boeing, also invest in the pilot training process by, for example, sponsoring flying training costs via scholarships.  

In contrast, no Indian university offers a flight training programme, and no aircraft manufacturer sponsors aspiring pilots.  Air India is the only airline to enter the field so far, with an upcoming FTO at Amravati in Maharashtra, scheduled to commence operations in the second half of 2025.  As regards ownership and size, our FTOs are usually owned by businessmen, often in partnerships,  and  the largest holds around 40 aircraft, while most have less than 10.

Higher Management

It is fairly common in the US for the owner to also run the FTO. This is due to the fact that most owners are also current or retired aviators, often with substantial flight instructional experience. In contrast, the majority of current Indian FTO leaders, or Accountable Managers (AMs), come from non- aviation backgrounds, such as business, engineering, HR , finance, sales, and others. There are several reasons for this, one being that the qualification/ experience requirements for an AM are quite nebulous.  This is somewhat mystifying, considering that the job demands some very specific skills, a short list of which includes the ability to perform minute-to-minute management of manpower and assets in a rapidly changing three-dimensional environment, pursue business development, and oversee operations, flying and ground training standards, safety protocols, and maintenance processes. The icing on the cake is that all these responsibilities have to be discharged in one of the most highly-regulated professions in the world, in the face of imponderables such as the weather, human frailties, machine failures,  and the unique set of aviation hazards that exists due to the very young and inexperienced student  (and sometimes even employee) community.  The reader is free to decide whether this is an appropriate workload for someone who has no flying experience. 

Further, senior retired or serving aviators are conspicuous by their absence in the higher management of our FTOs. This is remarkable for two reasons. One, it happens in the same country where 215, or almost 40%, of the members of the current Lok Sabha are over 61 years old, with 94 being between 66 and 75, and 11 being above 76 years.   The nation obviously believes that these veteran politicians still have something useful to offer to it, but this sentiment is missing when it comes to utilising the services of veteran aviators in the FTO industry. Two,  the operations of the most successful, popular, and reputed legacy FTOs in India, whose names are known to all the old hands in the industry, were run very successfully for years by retired or current aviators,  almost all of whom were also, incidentally, military veterans. Once they departed, there was a perceptible drop in standards at these institutions. In more than one case, a spate of accidents and serious incidents followed their exits. Once again, the reader is free to decide the purport of these data points.

Profits

Contrary to public perception, the FTO business garners marginal profits. This is almost universal; for example, during a boom in the US, some of the successful privately-owned flight schools were sold to venture capitalists, but the return on investment was so low, compared to other businesses, that several failed.   The problem is high expenses. Salaries, especially those of senior flying supervisors and maintenance heads, consume a large chunk of the revenue. Aviation gasoline (AVGAS) is expensive. Land lease and infrastructure maintenance costs are high. In the case of India, the problem is compounded because,  at the time of writing,  the country does not manufacture a light trainer, and imported aircraft can cost as much as US $ 800,000 or even more apiece, with spares being proportionally priced. During a briefing a few years ago - and this may have changed  now -  a seasoned international FTO auditor had disclosed that, worldwide,  a five per cent profit was very good news for an FTO.   This profit is dependent on the hours flown. Quite like an airline, unless an FTO keeps the maximum aircraft in the air for the maximum time, it struggles to generate revenue. 

In recent times, the plethora of businessmen-owners has led to a largely profit-oriented mindset. For a variety of reasons that are out of the scope of this study,  aiming for large profits in the FTO business is like chasing a rainbow. What most owners don’t get is that the FTO business is more akin to a “service” industry than a “manufacturing” one. Therefore, while suffering losses is certainly not recommended, one should keep rational expectations of profits. As some FTOs have realised, overreaching usually results in adverse consequences; unfortunately, these lessons came at costs ranging from reputational damage, to even young lives.

Environment and Gender Mix

An FTO can best be described as blend of a school and a residential college or university. While classroom teaching, examinations, and a routine are common to both institutions,  the uniformed and largely youthful trainee community is redolent of a school.  Conversely, due to its being residential, not burdened with too many rules, containing a significant proportion  of graduates, and the absence of supervision by parents/ guardians within the premises, it also possesses the essentials of a college/ university with hostel facilities.  As regards the gender mix, unlike the predominance of older, experienced teachers of both sexes in schools and colleges, flight instructors in FTOs are overwhelmingly male and young,  sometimes being as much as five years younger than the trainees they teach.  And finally, but significantly,  Indian FTOs have the highest percentage of female trainees in the world (typically around 15%, as compared to around 5-6% worldwide).

Competition and Training Schedules

The FTO industry is intensely competitive,  especially during slumps in the airline sector. A leading airline (IndiGo) runs a successful Cadet Programme in partnership with a few carefully-chosen FTOs, wherein the latter are fed a steady stream of selected  trainees, which bolsters their revenues and reputations.  As regards timeframe, it is generally accepted that it takes about 24 months, starting from scratch, to complete the ground and flight training syllabus and apply for a CPL. This is a rough estimate, since infrastructure, assets,  and processes differ from company to company. However, whenever the industry booms and airlines start hiring,  immense pressure, both external and internal,  is exerted on FTOs to ramp up “production” of pilots and reduce the duration of training. Quite often, the main criterion for an aspirant to select an FTO in these periods is not its safety record or the calibre of its products, but how fast it promises to complete the training syllabus. 

Human Factors in Operations

Can Anyone Become a Pilot?

The focus of this study being the human element, one issue that needs to be examined at the outset is whether anyone can become a pilot. When asked why they want to become pilots,  a desire to fly is the reason offered by the vast majority of young men and women. However,  becoming a pilot isn’t just a matter of ambition meeting opportunity. Traditionally, it wasn’t an easy process. For instance, prior to about 2010, the DGCA theory papers were arguably the toughest in the world. Veterans who went through the Airline Transport Pilot’s Licence (ATPL) process will remember how brutal the Navigation examinations were in that era; if the voluminous, largely subjective-type paper didn’t trip you up, the ensuing viva surely would! Even senior airline First Officers passed all the examinations after multiple attempts spread out over years. 

Over time, several factors, such as the still-growing industry of private coaching institutes, improved reference material and teaching tools, a moderation in the standards of examination papers, and more attempts at papers per year via online means, have eased the examination process considerably.  Improvements in the overall economic health and living standards of the country, and rising aspirations of the youth, have also expanded the talent pool. As regards flying skills, that is a subject by itself, but one factor - the booming video game industry -  has helped, even unintentionally, to improve a key element in a pilot’s skill set, i.e. hand-eye coordination.

It would therefore appear that anyone with the ambition and means to become a pilot can easily achieve his/her goal. The truth could not be more different, because, under the surface, lurks a series of critical requirements. A short list of these is -  a generous sprinkling of technical aptitude, well-developed cognitive abilities and motor skills, strong problem-solving and decision-making skills, above average communication and multi-tasking capabilities, highly evolved situational awareness and self-preservation instincts, and the ability and maturity to remain calm under pressure – all of which are not formally taught, but learnt on the job. One also needs to lead a healthy and disciplined lifestyle, the latter highlighted because, as mentioned earlier, aviation is one of the most heavily regulated professions in the world. It has to be,  because the outcome of a missing/ misinterpreted rule is often a catastrophe involving mass casualties. There is no place in this profession for mavericks or free-thinking liberals who regard rules as unnecessary obstacles - at least not at the office, which as some glossy airline recruitment posters depict, is often 30,000 ft above terra firma. 

A final observation on this issue is that FTOs are neither staffed nor designed to equip  trainees with the above-mentioned personal and professional traits. Therefore,  trainees largely behave in accordance with the values, principles, and morals they bring from home, which are highly variable across society, and which, in some cases, may not be conducive to learning the right lessons or imbibing the desired qualities of an aviator. To summarise,  there is a difference between learning to fly an aircraft, which is more of a skill, and becoming a safe and successful aviator, which is more of a mindset.  A keen desire to fly is just not enough to become the latter. Statistics too bear this out, because several youngsters go through the syllabus, obtain a CPL, and yet fail to convert it into a career.  

Humans Beings in Aviation Training

In the same manner as other professional training institutions, FTOs provide training for a specific profession. However, all similarities with other professions end there. Flying training is conducted in a unique, three-dimensional environment. Some highlights of the FTO work-life milieu and associated Human Factors are:- 

Licensing Requirements and Academic Competence

The aviation industry follows the “Catch Them Young” philosophy, and young here means very young. Anyone over 18 years can obtain a CPL; there is a fair chance that the First Officer on the next commercial flight you take will be less than 21 years old. As far as regulatory licensing requirements are concerned, apart from being medically fit, one has to pass five theory papers with at least 70% marks, obtain an R/T license, and complete 200 hrs of flying. However, there is a loophole here –  no upper limit is stipulated for number of attempts at the papers, and one has come across trainees who have scraped through after more than a dozen attempts. 

Regarding basic academic competence, the requirement is a passing grade in Class XII, with Maths and Physics; however, a proposal has recently been fast-tracked to amend even this minimal requirement, on which more will be discussed later.   Since no minimum marks are mentioned, even candidates with 40-45% marks in these subjects are free to enrol in an FTO, and they do. 

Therefore, it is clear that the educational qualifications and academic competence standards necessary to obtain a pilot’s license are among the lowest across the spectrum of industry sectors. Indeed, it is far easier to meet them, than to get admission in any discipline in a bottom-rung college.  That being said, it is also true that many graduates from engineering and other fields opt for aviation. Some airlines also exercise their own quality control by insisting on higher cut-off marks while hiring. Finally, post hiring, all airlines also impart customised ground training to meet their requirements. 

The Chief Flying Instructor (CFI)

This individual has always been a key figure in an FTO.  Traditionally,  the owners or government overseers of flying clubs had  a strictly hands-off policy in regard to operations. A feudal system thus emerged, where the CFI became the de facto boss; consequently, he (they were predominantly males in those days) ran the place as he desired. One could rightly term several of these legacy  FTOs “One-Man Shows,” and some of the traditions and mindsets of those times still linger. With increased corporatisation across all professions, however, the scenario has also altered in FTOs. Alongside, General Managers have been replaced by Accountable Managers (AMs), and CFIs  are held to a higher standard. The management expects them to deliver quality pilots with speed and efficiency, and safety does find a mention in internal conversations. 

Nevertheless, today’s typical CFI remains an important and powerful person. He or she has usually accumulated an impressive tally of flying hours, and is paid on a scale comparable with a senior airline captain.  An elevated status and tremendous influence come with the job, as does the power to make or break careers. Even now,  some AMs hesitate to step into the CFI’s domain. Ergo, the personality and conduct of its CFI have a significant influence on the operational and safety  culture of an FTO, and the mindset of its products. To paraphrase an old Sanskrit saying,  "As the king, so the subjects."   Further, as a number of the current CFIs are young men and women between their mid-twenties and early thirties, the power they hold and exercise  is often inversely proportional to their life experience.  A final, but significant, factor here is that there never seem to be enough CFIs available to man the all the FTOs, and they are always in high demand. 

Flight Instructors

If the CFI is the brain, then flight instructors are the limbs. Most FTO instructors are not permanent employees. The reason is that, while almost all aspirants become pilots to fly airliners, the cyclic nature of  the commercial aviation industry leads to extended periods when airline jobs are scarce.  Several young pilots then take up short-term contractual jobs as flight instructors at FTOs,  aiming to stay gainfully employed and in current flying touch till the market recovers. Conversely, when the airline sector is on an upswing, a severe shortage of instructors ensues, which is difficult to overcome without compromising on quality.  As a result, FTOs have a shifting population of instructors, with some serving less than a year. Maintaining instructional standards is a perennial problem, as any current CFI will testify. 

Teaching Model

Flight instruction is a vast topic, and a detailed review of it is outside the scope of this study. However, in brief, it is a 3-D teaching model, where theory is first explained and tested on the ground, then practically demonstrated and learned in the air, after some exposure on a simulator i.e. a Flight and Navigation Procedure Trainer (FNPT), whose performance and training capabilities, incidentally,  are well below those of an airline-standard Full Flight Simulator (FFS). Flight instruction is also unique in the sense that it is conducted one-on-one, i.e.,  one instructor takes up one student at a time. Within the specified CPL syllabus of 200 hrs, a student has to learn a lot. There is very little margin for repeat lessons, and extra sorties cost in excess of Rs 25000/- per hour. Time really is money here!

Instructor – Student Relationships

Having taken a detailed look at the human beings in flight training,  a quick word on instructor-student relationships is in order. Usually, these relationships are deep and long-lasting; it would be safe to say that one may forget one’s first primary school teacher, but will probably never forget one’s first flight instructor. Regularly sharing time and confined space in an inherently dangerous profession produces a bond laced with a certain excitement, a “high,”  and these shared experiences have no parallel in the training processes of other professions. Paradigm shifts in the socio-moral construct have added their own influences to these relationships. The implications of these factors are explored later. 

Safety Challenges and Hazards           

Some of the operational safety challenges and hazards that accrue due to Human Factors are:-

Effect of Market Forces

It has been mentioned earlier about how, during boom periods when airlines start hiring aggressively, FTOs come under pressure to graduate pilots quickly.   A competition can now start amongst them, with some FTOs advertising ridiculously low course completion timelines, which are not attainable without resorting to short cuts and sharp practices, all of which adversely impact training standards. The result can be inadequately trained pilots with low skill and knowledge levels, a most dangerous situation indeed. These cases may not even be visible immediately, but will, more likely than not, show up eventually.

A Dysfunctional Safety Reporting Culture

Take, for example, an FTO in a remote location, run by the combination of a profit-chasing AM lacking a core aviation background,  and a young CFI under pressure to generate revenue hours. The latter would endeavour to keep the maximum aircraft in the air for the maximum time. Aircraft occasionally develop defects, and pilots or engineers make mistakes. A process exists to report these occurrences on regulatory safety channels; unfortunately, for reasons explained a little later, this process can be cumbersome and often involves grounding the concerned aircraft and/or crew for considerable time.  All too often,  therefore, a decision is taken to interpret reporting guidelines conveniently, and the defect/occurrence remains unreported.  Over time, a trend of non-reporting gets established in the FTO, and this fossilises into a pathological reporting culture, whose credo remains, “If no outsider saw it, it didn’t happen.”  The CFI/AM combination has only been used to illustrate the process;  it may well be initiated by the Maintenance Manager/AM combination,  or the AM himself. 

Worldwide studies across industries have shown that any  organisation which focuses excessively on production often discourages its employees from reporting minor safety occurrences, and becomes the ideal breeding ground for an accident.  In the context of an FTO, this practice also sets a very poor example to young instructors and trainees, especially when they are destined for airlines, where safety reporting is the norm, not the exception. However, the issue is multi-faceted and needs some exploration, especially because the process is entirely human-driven. Here are two major reasons why FTOs are prone to non-reporting of safety occurrences:- 

Financial Pressures

As mentioned earlier, FTOs operate on thin budgets. In a company holding, say, five aircraft, one taken out of the flightline, even for a minor unserviceability or incident, means the loss of eight to ten revenue hours, or about Rs 2,50,000/- per day. An instructor grounded pending clearance after a safety occurrence is also a liability, as he continues to get paid, but generates no revenue. Quite often, therefore, financial pressures can overpower safety considerations and lead to an unofficial, yet institutionalised, process of non-reporting defects or other safety occurrences, as described above. 

Over- regulation

Stringent regulations for reporting operational safety events are another strong reason for non-reporting. The same safety occurrence reporting Civil Aviation Requirement (CAR)   is applied on scheduled operators (airlines), and general aviation organisations (which include FTOs), and this is inappropriate for a number of reasons:-

First,  the aircraft used in both fields are entirely different, in terms of both design and performance. Even the engines and most onboard systems are different. 

Second, a detailed scrutiny of the CAR reveals that almost one-third of the listed reportable occurrences are not applicable to FTO operations. Yet, with every revision of the CAR, more reportable occurrences get added. 

Third, minor occurrences in FTOs,  i.e. those resulting in no damage to the engine or airframe, are viewed  as if they have occurred on airliners. A typical case is that of tailskid scrapes, which are fairly common occurrences on a popular training aircraft, the Diamond DA-40, and which, in this author’s experience, do not result in damage to the airframe. On the other hand, tail strikes on  airliners do result in variable degrees of damage. Presently, both cases are treated alike by the regulator, with the same outcomes; prolonged grounding of aircraft and aircrew, until the regulatory inquiry is concluded and clearance given. With the recent announcement that 200 more DA-40 NGs are likely to be inducted into Indian FTOs, tail skid strikes are only going to increase - and so will the trend of non-reporting.   Finally, the CAR leaves no latitude in the hands of the local safety staff, despite all FTO Safety Managers (SMs) being accorded approval from DGCA, after stringent testing.  

The Operations Manager

In all FTOs, the CFI exercises executive control over the daily flight training schedule via the Operations Dept. This dept is often headed by an Operations Manager, which is a local designation, not mandated by any regulation. Wherever employed,  these persons are overwhelmingly non-aviators, and this practice  brings its own disadvantages. While the job content and roles are roughly the same as Schedulers/ Dispatchers in airlines, one major difference exists.  Airline staffers require prior experience as pilots/ other flight crew/ meteorologists/ ATC controllers etc., and must be trained in aviation subjects such as navigation, regulations, meteorology, and technical aspects of aircraft and operations,   FTO Operations staff, on the other hand,  do not require formal training or certification. Therefore, they are usually people from random backgrounds who enter the organisation at a fairly junior administrative level, and learn on the job. Over time, some become proficient in planning the day’s flight schedule and dispatching aircraft to achieve the plan, an activity which directly impacts production of flight hours and hence, profits. They then rise in the company to managerial or quasi-managerial levels. In large FTOs, with CFIs busy meeting their own heavy flying commitments and attending to other tasks, Operations Managers can accumulate powers disproportionate to their expertise and experience.  

Hazards and Implications

The primary hazard in this situation is that, not being aviators themselves, Operations Managers are unschooled in the multiple risks inherent in aviation, especially in the training stage. Further, even if some have acquired informal experience due to long tenures, there is a major conflict of interest. Being primarily drivers of operations, production of flight hours and profits usually dominate their thoughts and decisions.  One cannot, therefore, expect them to  objectively  assess operational conditions, fitness of pilots, and the myriad elements that go into conducting safe aviation. These factors motivate them to exercise risky options, such as pressurising instructors to fly in doubtful weather, or trying to push in in one more quick day flight before sunset, which can result in a pilot operating in conditions beyond those permitted by the license or rating.

This is a most undesirable and inherently unsafe state of affairs in an FTO, because Operations Managers bear no formal operational responsibility, yet can, in a loosely-run organisation, virtually control operations. And finally, when things go wrong, the hapless CFI gets blamed and penalised for their flawed plans or actions. 

The CFI and his Influence

From the operational and regulatory point of view, the CFI is the face of the organisation, who often bears the burden of the organisation’s reputation. Unsurprisingly, therefore, some FTOs are better known by their CFIs than by the owners!  All CFIs are acutely aware of their status and powers. So are the instructors and trainees, and conditions are thus ripe for establishment of personality cults. To some extent, the blame does not lie with the CFI, because it comes with the job;  we live in a socio-economic construct where revering those in positions of power and authority is endemic. In aviation, however, apart from being unhealthy and unprofessional, it also creates a very dangerous situation, because anyone possessing, or even being perceived as possessing, unbridled power, has  the potential to become a liability by generating a variety of safety hazards. 

Safety Hazards and Implications

Some typical unsafe behaviour patterns,  usually - but not exclusively - seen amongst those  CFIs who have spent many years in the same FTO, are:

Increased Risk-taking

All veteran aviators are aware of three non-negotiable entities - weather, fuel, and ground obstacles or terrain. Irrespective of how many thousands of hours one may have flown, one just does not disrespect this holy trinity. However, years of operating in the same environment, doing the same job, and most importantly, being the sole authority to take critical operational decisions day after day, can, in some cases, lead to complacency and increased risk-taking with regard to this trinity. There is also the strong possibility of displacement of risks  on to the younger flight instructors; for instance,  a CFI might get away with a risky inflight option due to his experience and skill,  but a young instructor who emulates him may not be so lucky. 

Unrestricted and Unsafe Planning

With no one to double-check their plans, and burdened by constant demands to generate more flight hours and graduate more trainees, CFIs may embark on whimsical and risky enterprises, with potentially harmful or even disastrous consequences. Habitually flying in marginal weather, riding instructors to the limits of their physical and mental capacities, putting pressure on maintenance staff to clear unserviceable aircraft quickly - these are just a few negative trends that can be set in motion. DGCA appears to have recognised this problem, and there has been a  rise in regulatory censures and penalties imposed on errant CFIs and Deputy CFIs in the past few years, apart from suggesting another step which will be discussed later.  Yet, things do go wrong, and an example is given below.

Accidents in Poor Visibility

Surface visibility is a key factor in FTO operations. Trainees are authorised to fly only in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC), which stipulate a surface visibility of more than 5 km and a certain distance from clouds. This is an inbuilt safety guardrail, designed to protect inexperienced pilots from situations where they may be unable to visually acquire the runway/ acquire it too late to make a stable approach and landing. The problem here is that visibility usually is below 5 km for long periods during the winter months, especially in North India. During the four-month monsoon, low clouds add to the problem. 

At controlled airfields, a qualified Meteorologist from the India Met Dept assesses the visibility and issues a forecast valid for the next few hours. At uncontrolled ones, there is no forecaster, and the CFI is authorised to decide the visibility. This is where subjective interpretation comes in. In some cases, CFIs, desperate to generate revenue, declare visibility as 5 km even when it is noticeably below that, and launch trainees either for solo flights, or with young instructors for instructional sorties.  These youngsters then have problems landing the aircraft, and several close shaves and even accidents have occurred in these conditions.   In some fairly recent cases, CFIs/ senior supervisors themselves crashed while operating in low visibility conditions, which may have been a contributory factor.   Recently, in Feb 2025, DGCA has attempted to standardize the process of visibility declaration and monitoring at uncontrolled airfields.    This is a very welcome and positive step, but there remain lacunae which can be exploited.

Effects of Personality and Behaviour

A little bit about this issue has already been stated earlier. As the senior-most pilot in the organisation, the CFI’s personality traits and conduct become objects of scrutiny and often,  emulation, by the younger staff and trainees. With the trend towards younger CFIs, it is of utmost importance that their professional and even personal transgressions, such as flying indiscipline, negligence, misuse of power, parochialism, nepotism, and irrational decision-making, should invite the top management’s intervention and counselling. When that does not happen, irrational and subjective decision-making continues, hazards are created, and risks multiply. 

The CFI  - Hero or Villian?

Before moving on, it must be clarified that “CFI-shaming” was not the intent of the above section. These young people have considerably weighty responsibilities, such as generating maximum flight hours to keep recharging the company’s coffers, fulfilling daily energy-sapping personal flying commitments, overseeing the flying performance of up to 150 trainees and 20 instructors at a time, monitoring the weather, Operations staff, environment, and the position of each aircraft in the air, keeping up with mounds of paperwork, staying abreast of changing regulations and directives, addressing all regulatory observations, and fighting off mind-numbing fatigue day after day to stay alert, so that they are able to respond to unusual occurrences, such as a panicky trainee with a minor emergency,  in the most sensible manner. In short, it is quite a Herculean task.

CFIs also live under the apocryphal Sword of Damocles, because regulatory penalties for operational errors or violations, even if not personally committed by them, are severe. Hence, they have hardly any personal time; their minds are on-duty even if they are off-duty. One must, therefore,  appreciate those who do opt for the job and perform it sincerely.  All the hazardous behavioural patterns or attitudes mentioned above and their resultant risks are only illustrations of what can go wrong if an unsuitable person is in charge, or if higher management abdicates its supervisory and counselling responsibilities. It is also not necessary that a single person will display all the stated unsafe behavioural traits. In sum,  the CFI is not the villain of the piece, by far. 

Gender and Relationship Issues

Modern gender equations and attitudes have recently emerged as significant factors in the FTO environment, and need to be considered in some detail, as they do impact safety. The ratio of male to female students has been mentioned earlier. For the same reasons that schools and colleges prohibit intimate relationships between teachers and students, FTOs also place rigid limits to fraternisation between the instructor and trainee communities - at least in theory. Apart from ethical considerations common to all educational/ training institutions, there are several  specific and excellent reasons for this stand in an aviation organisation, which are elaborated below. 

However,  it is necessary to first deal with the matter of relationships, and for that, it is important to understand what a flight  instructor in an FTO represents to trainees.   Flight instructors are proficient fliers, as well as knowledgeable and skilled teachers; indeed, teaching a student to perform manoeuvres competently and safely,  while simultaneously handling the aircraft and monitoring the environment, is a very specialised skill. Students perceive how much effort their instructors are putting in to teach them complex manoeuvres within a limited time, as well as owning responsibility for their (the students’) progress and  standards. Common sentiments in such situations include a deep sense of gratitude towards the instructors, for virtually “making their lives,” by training them for a high-paying profession. Very significantly, instructors and students spend substantial time together in one-to-one sessions, be it the close confines of a cockpit, or the briefing room. Living in the same campus also provides opportunities for off-work interactions. The strong possibility that most instructors will sooner or later become airline pilots adds to their persona. Therefore, flight instructors are frequently seen as role models by students, imparting not only flying training,  but also direction and advice on career prospects, market trends, and other facets of aviation.    In other words, after being cast in the mould of mentors by default, they often become  “One-Stop Shops” to provide solutions to life’s professional and personal problems. 

The stage is therefore set for hero-worship, which can, occasionally,  transform into affection, and that is perhaps natural; it is also where the emotional connect, if any,  should cease. The problem occurs when feelings deepen beyond affection,  and this transition is not easy to detect in the busy environs of an FTO, mainly because most of the interactions are unsupervised. Telltale signs, however, are visible to anyone who is looking out for them. The work-life environment of the FTO also matters; any place where a “resort-like” culture prevails, or where the CFI/ senior instructors and other staff do not possess the maturity/ intent to intervene, is far more conducive to these relationships. 

Safety Implications and Hazards

Shifting societal perspectives on life choices, morals, and hierarchy amongst the youth of today, as well as evolving views on personal/professional  zones, have led to a new paradigm of student- instructor relationships in FTOs. Wherever this shift causes a breakdown of the traditional, well-established boundaries between these two groups, and the sub-groups of gender within them, the result is a loss of objectivity, which promotes unprofessional decision-making by instructors. Essentially,  it creates an intangible hazard, by opening the door to  informal, subjective,  and unsafe behaviour in the professional sphere, leading to a quantum jump in the risk profile of the institution. The simplest examples of such behaviour are - clearing certain trainees for solo flights without checking their readiness  or fitness, accelerating their flying without confirming if they have absorbed what has been taught, and  lowering standards for check flights.  Finally, to underscore the importance of this point, one need only remember the unpleasant fact that, with no prejudice to the actions or memories of the departed souls, in several past fatal training accidents, where the primary cause was determined as Human Factors, the crew composition was a male instructor and a female trainee. 

Career Perceptions and Societal Influences

One of the major, even if  perceived,  attractions of a career in civil aviation is the fast, indulgent, glamourous, and liberal lifestyle that airline pilots supposedly follow. In recent years, there has also been a marked increase in social drinking and other substance intake amongst the youth in general. In these circumstances, some young instructors and trainees, often barely out of their teens, and eagerly looking forward to life in the fast lane,  “embrace the future,” too enthusiastically, and this is manifested in over-the-top partying and unchecked substance use. In a pilot training organisation, the hazards and implications are obvious.  Societal influences are also significant, because trainees, and even young instructors, are at an impressionable,  vulnerable age and stage of life and flying experience, and the temptation to violate flight profiles, to do something “heroic” or “forbidden,” can be too much to resist. AI - generated stunts performed in contemporary aviation-based movies, which are impossible in the real world,  add to the temptation to try and emulate Tom Cruise or Hrithik Roshan. Indeed,  a few trainees feel that if they can’t experience some thrills while flying slow-moving training aircraft, the aviation experience remains incomplete. The risks of such influences and mindsets are obvious.

Insufficient Quality Control

As already discussed, every aviation enthusiast cannot become a successful pilot. Military pilot trainees, after being selected through a rigorous process,  are constantly evaluated throughout their training, and those who cannot make the grade after being given additional flight hours are suspended from the programme, even if they are at advanced stages of the syllabus. At times, suspension rates in a batch have reached 50%. On the other hand,  suspensions for failure to learn flying are almost negligible in civil FTOs. This is despite the fact that some unsuitable  candidates are clearly visible even at the Ground School stage. Inability to understand concepts and poor numerical/ cognitive skills are early indicators. Repeat failures in internal exams, despite extra coaching, and passing mandatory regulatory papers after 10-12 attempts, are clear indicators that something is amiss, and that a training progress review is necessary.  

At the time of writing the final draft of this study, news reports emerged stating that DGCA has decided to do away with the requirement for pilot aspirants to have studied Maths and Physics in Class XII, and to open up the field to Arts and Commerce students.   Since this proposal pertains to Human Factors, it is necessary to include a brief discussion on it here, at the admitted cost of extending an already voluminous  study. 

This author bases his views on his long  experience as the Chief Ground Instructor (CGI) at an FTO, and having  personally taught Technical General and Navigation (the two most technically-intensive subjects) for several years.  In fact, it is not known if the CGIs of FTOs, or owners of private coaching institutes, were consulted prior to the announcement of this move; if they weren’t, they should have been. After all, they are going to teach the newly-inducted students.  

In the opinion of this author, this move is neither necessary nor appropriate, and needs to be reconsidered,  for at least the following reasons:-

The core issue is quality control. Firstly, while there is no doubt that the Maths and Physics topics covered in Class XII are not needed for pilots, it is also a fact, that a major part of the flight theory syllabus, and even parts of navigation theory, falls  under the category of applied sciences;  in other words, very few of the topics in these syllabi have been taught in school.  The few that have been covered have been taught in isolation, not in connection with their applications in  aviation.  The syllabi also incorporate healthy doses of Maths and Physics, and small doses of Chemistry. A major advantage enjoyed by those who took Science in school is that they are current in these subjects when they enter an FTO, and this currency helps greatly in understanding applied concepts such as airflow behaviour,  radio wave propagation, engine performance, and many more, which they will immediately be exposed to in an FTO ground school. 

Secondly,  a contention that Arts and Commerce students already have the required understanding of these subjects from whatever they have studied in junior classes (which would be around Class VI- VIII)  is not reflective of on-ground realities.  The contemporary pool of young people who have recently left school, or even college,  have lived a different life than their predecessors.  In brief, they have grown up in a world saturated with data,  an era where new information is constantly replacing older information. They also operate in a dense digital and social media environment, where old concepts and theories continue to be challenged on almost a daily basis. It is very unlikely that concepts learnt five or six years prior will remain fresh in their minds, for they would have been overlaid by recently-gained information and knowledge, including the subject matter of Arts or Commerce. One also needs to recall that the Class XII students of today were in Class VII and VIII during the COVID-19 pandemic. A lot of their learning was online, a method which was still in its infancy, and not particularly effective. Perhaps this clutch of reasons is why these students are as yet not eligible to take up Medicine and Engineering. Is it wise to take chances with a far riskier profession such as aviation?

Thirdly, the need for this move is questionable. Arts and Commerce students have been not been denied opportunities to become pilots; they have, for the past roughly two decades, been provided an avenue via the Open Schooling system. This process involves attending some revision classes in Maths and Physics, and an exam. It is better to continue utilising this avenue, because at least some currency in Science subjects is restored, rather than creating a new path where one has to restart from scratch. 

Fourthly, comparisons with licensing regimes in other countries/areas which do not require Maths and Physics are irrelevant and misleading. The vast majority of these regimes operate in Western/ developed countries/areas, where the quality of education is of a different level, due to better-organised educational infrastructure and higher teacher availability; conversely, we are in the midst of a longstanding  crisis in the education sector, telling signs of which are that one in seven schools in the country is being run by a single teacher, who teaches all subjects to all classes,   and that a disturbingly high percentage of students in higher classes are not able to read text, or reproduce simple mathematics operations such as division, taught in lower classes.    It is admitted that a lot of these schools are in rural areas, but it must also be borne in mind that aspirational India is likely to see more students from such areas entering aviation via scholarship schemes or otherwise. Also, the overseas regimes are fully mature,  with higher automation and tighter safety nets; we have a long way to go in this respect. There is thus a lower tolerance for individual deficiencies, be they of knowledge, understanding, or application of aviation theory,  in our regime.

The final observation is somewhat peripheral, but significant in the context of quality control, which is the core issue. There are significant differences in the manner CPL check rides (the final flying tests,  called Skill Tests in India) are conducted in other licensing regimes. The primary one is that the Examiners are either from or associated with the regulatory bodies (the US FAA/ EU EASA/Australian CASA, for example), unlike in India where the local CFI/Dy CFI is the Examiner. Secondly, and more to the point,  a written test and viva are  conducted before the check ride in at least two of these regimes; one does not proceed for the check ride unless both are cleared. In other words, a trainee pilot in these regimes has to stay updated with all theory subjects right up to the time of obtaining a license. In India, there is no testing of ground subjects prior to  the check rides. Therefore, in the worst case,  a student may have attended theory classes four years ago, the papers could have been passed one by one in the intervening  years (since they are valid for five years from the date of passing), and the knowledge gained at that time would last have been tested in the Student Pilots’ License (SPL) orals conducted as far back as, say,  three years ago.  And yet, the only criterion for graduation and further issue of CPL is flying skill! A more incongruous situation would be hard to find.  

Adding students with non-technical backgrounds to the mix is not, therefore, a sound idea. Even if they do graduate and get licenses, once in the job market, too many may soon discover that becoming a pilot and getting hired by an airline are often two very different things.

One must, however, also make note of what appears to be some good news, on a separate but related matter. As part of reforms suggested by the Association of Flying Training Organisations to DGCA, it has been recommended that there be no compromise on the regulatory requirement to complete 350 periods of ground classes at FTOs.  This is to address an unwelcome trend observed amongst the youth, of passing papers by self-study, and joining FTOs only to complete the flying syllabus. It is hoped that this suggestion will be approved.  FTOs could similarly suggest a review on the matter of admitting Arts and Commerce students, to maintain standards of competence in a profession where human frailty is a known hazard. 

Finally, on this matter, even if the rules are revised to admit Arts and Commerce students, which seems likely considering the advanced stage of the approval process,  a suggestion to alleviate its possible adverse effects is provided in the “Recommendations” section of this study

To pick up the thread of what was being discussed before this minor diversion, which was how most FTOs deal with low performers in Ground School. Instead of holding the student back to repeat the syllabus, the overwhelming majority of FTOs pass  the “problem child” on to the Flight School. If the student underperforms here as well,  the soft approach continues, for a host of reasons, chief being the potential revenue loss to the FTO if training is suspended. Therefore, such misfits are shepherded through the programme via a variety of creative methods and finally,  graduated through modified passing standards during the final check flights. The conveniently-assumed premise is that their limitations and deficiencies would magically vanish after obtaining a license, or remain concealed in the multi-crew and substantially automated environs of an airline. Somewhere in this prolonged process, of course, the student also manages to pass the required ground subject papers.

Safety Implications and Hazards

A comparison was made earlier to military aviation training. While it is acknowledged that civil aviation has several safety cushions such as multi-crew cockpits, restricted flight profiles,  narrow regulatory tramlines,  and substantial automation, all of which negate imposition of military safety and training standards on trainees, it is also doubtful if each student in every FTO achieves the required competency standards, and graduates as a capable and safe pilot.  Often, substandard and unsafe trainees are evident as early as the pre-solo stage, yet they are allowed to continue. Even after a rare suspension for failure to learn flying at one FTO, a student can fairly easily enrol in another FTO,  which negates the point of the entire process, whenever followed. The final outcome of all these processes are incompetent and unskilled pilots, a major hazard.

Lack of Safety Training

In the vast majority of FTOs, no aviation safety training is imparted to pilots, be they instructors or trainees. While regulations mandating some basic safety training for all pilots do exist, they are easy to bypass by creating fake attendance rolls and lecture records. Reasons for this shortfall include management-induced time pressure to graduate trainees, a very severe shortage of qualified and competent Safety Managers, inadequate emphasis on safety by the top and line management, and no incentives for safety reporting. Pilots with no formal safety orientation are walking hazards, and if inexperience and low skill levels are added to the mix, the multiplier effect on risks is evident. 

How Human Factors in Regulatory Agencies Affect FTOs      

DGCA Surveillance Visits

FTOs are subject to periodical regulatory surveillance by teams of inspectors. These teams often carry a Safety rep along, whose mandate is basically to audit the FTOs SMS. Two problems have been observed here. First, inspectors tend to view FTOs through the lens of their experience of airline safety infrastructure, and expect airline-standard resources, manning, and data handling in the Safety Dept of an FTO. Second, very often, the inspector  focuses on the SM and the working of the Safety Dept, while paying rudimentary attention to operations. This is akin to policing the police and ignoring the citizens. In the bargain, the safety environment of the FTO is not critically assessed by a trained expert, who could help identify undetected hazards.

The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB)

What the mind does not know, the eye does not see. In this author’s experience, investigators in the AAIB are far more experienced in dealing with accidents/ serious incidents in airlines, as compared to FTOs. It also appears that the vast majority -if not all - of them are non-aviators, which in itself is contrary to the practice followed in well-known regulatory investigative agencies such as the US NTSB, the UK AAIB, and the French BEA. Therefore, are they likely to be well-versed in the operational Human Factors at FTOs, such as the power structures, working styles, demographic aspects, and relationships described above,  and most importantly, the safety hazards  that exist  in the operational milieu of an FTO, as opposed to that of an airline? This question begs some deliberation. If the answer is “No,” then there are definite safety implications, the main one being that investigations will not reveal root causes of accidents, and repetitions will occur.

Misperceptions of the Safety Manager’s Role and Responsibility

It would be remiss to leave this section without mentioning the role of another human being at an FTO, the SM, particularly because, even in this day and age,  far too many people believe that the safety of the organisation is the SM’s responsibility. Nothing could be further from the truth.  For a detailed look at the usual organisational constraints on this individual,  one may like to refer to an article penned by this author in the Sep 2024 issue of this magazine.  In the context of this study, one need only to look at what Skybrary, the online aviation resource,  says about the SM’s role and responsibilities - “The operational safety activities are the line managers’ responsibilities. While the SM may be held accountable for any shortcomings in the SMS itself, the SM should not be accountable for the safety performance of the organisation. The SM is responsible and accountable for providing effective support to line managers to ensure the success of their safety management efforts, and to communicate safety-related issues within the organisation directly to top management”. In other words, the SM’s mandate is to run the Safety Management System (SMS) efficiently;  he/she cannot and must not be held responsible for the unsafe decisions and acts of omission or commission of line managers, employees, or even trainees. 

Recommendations

What can be done to change the operational environment at FTOs and reduce accidents due to Human Factors? Quite a lot, actually, and without much effort. The first requirement is for the stakeholders to acknowledge that there is a problem, and then set about solving it. Some suggestions to ensure a positive safety culture in the operational environment are now provided. The executors include the Ministry, the regulator, and the FTOs themselves.

Increased Participation of Stakeholders

The fact that one of the largest airlines in the US (and the world), ventured into the FTO business in 2022, is a clear indicator that more user participation is the way forward. Therefore, more Indian airlines, led perhaps by IndiGo, need to set up FTOs to train their own pilots. The process need not be onerous; they could acquire a few existing FTOs, or run them as joint ventures,  and restructure them to meet industry requirements. Collateral benefits would include other FTOs increasing their quality control to compete effectively.   Similarly, universities need to offer pilot training programmes, and aircraft manufacturers need to sponsor youngsters. This will ensure, among other things, that the best candidates amongst the available talent pool are selected for a demanding and dangerous job.

Appointing a Suitably Qualified AM/ A One-Two Team

It needs to be recognised that aviation has certain peculiarities that - literally and figuratively - transcend other businesses. An FTO leader must have the ability to view his company in three dimensions, a quality that several non-aviators find difficult to comprehend, but one that nevertheless, does exist. Therefore, all other things being equal, a pilot with substantial flying experience is a better choice as AM, than his non-aviation counterpart, primarily due to his greater ability to foresee the risks and likely consequences of his own and his team’s decisions and actions. A concerted regulatory push is recommended to induct senior aviators as FTO AMs, and these individuals should be the first choice for the job. The large community of retired military aviators/ instructors are a good pool to tap into; for some unfathomable reason, this community, which can contribute so much to safe and efficient aviation, is severely under-represented in the FTO industry. 

An optional and perhaps better arrangement would be a two-person team of top managers, comprising a senior veteran aviator with substantial experience of civil or military FTO operations as the AM, and a Deputy AM, who could be from a business, maintenance, or HR background, preferably aviation-related. This arrangement would ensure that all concerns regarding quality of training, safety and business are addressed comprehensively by professionals. Whichever be the option exercised, the net gain would  be  “safe production.”

Upskilling of Leaders

In order to make FTO Management a mainstream profession, along the same lines as airline management, it is recommended that DGCA promote the inclusion of a short course in FTO Management, similar to the Aviation Management capsules being run at some leading management/ educational institutions, which all AMs should undergo either before or shortly after being hired, as a requirement for obtaining regulatory approval. The content of the course needs to be structured around the operational, maintenance, administration, and safety challenges in FTOs, the attendant risks, and how to juxtapose them with business concerns. The main theme should be that aviation training is not just a business; it is a dangerous business, with far too many moving parts, and a constant threat to life, limb, or property. Skilful risk mitigation is the best way to conduct it. 

Orientation of CFIs and Senior Supervisors

A shift in the mindset of this group is recommended. This would entail structured professional counselling. In case this is not already happening, the periodical CFI/Dy CFI Refresher Courses conducted under the aegis of DGCA should also focus on the following areas:-

Prudent decision-making in the face of adversity, such as bad weather,  managerial pressure, aircraft unserviceability, issues concerning staff and trainees, etc

Laying down strict limits to the powers of Operations Managers

Maintaining a fair, transparent, and gender/ community-neutral stand towards instructors and trainees at and off work

Keeping the team of instructors together as a cohesive and efficient entity, which maintains “safe production” as its operational credo

Remembering that the CFI’s personality and behaviour are always observed very keenly by young, impressionable trainees, and that they should not pick up unprofessional/unsafe habits or practices

Being mindful and watchful regarding on-and-off-work relationships between instructors and trainees, and intervening proactively, swiftly, and decisively, to curtail any inappropriate ones, even as a precaution if necessary. 

Avoiding the tendency to treat trainees as customers, or equating their privileges with those of instructors. They are trainees, not trainee employees. 

Not hesitating to terminate the training of unsuitable trainees who fail to reach the required knowledge or skill standards despite additional coaching 

Formal Training and Certification of Operations Managers

One method to get around the problem of unqualified Operations Managers is to hire pilots, whether retired, medically unfit, or just unable to get a flying job. If that is not agreeable or possible, then some basic exposure to aviation processes and risks, such as a customised version of the training given to Schedulers and Dispatchers in airlines, must be provided. The modalities of how to conduct this training,  its detailed syllabus, and its certification,  are recommended for consideration at DGCA.

Encouraging Appointment of  Non-Flying CFIs

In Feb 2025, a very welcome regulatory provision was announced by DGCA. This permits a current/ retired aviator, up to 70 years of age, with/without valid/current ATPL/CPL, who has previously held the post of CFI in any FTO or has been a Qualified Flying Instructor in the military, to be appointed as a “non-flying CFI” at an FTO.      This  provision has obviously been introduced to improve, among other things,  the safety environment at FTOs by utilising the experience and expertise of these veterans to conduct safe flying, without themselves entering the cockpit. It is an excellent initiative, which would inject substantial doses of safety, quality,  and maturity into the operational environment. Unfortunately, this provision is not being utilised by FTOs, probably because of financial reasons, or fears of the CFI’s position and status being diluted by the presence of an older aviator, which, to an extent, is natural.  However, it is step in the right direction; more pressure needs to be exerted by DGCA on all FTOs to appoint non-flying CFIs, and merge them seamlessly into the operating  milieu.

Separate Safety Reporting CAR and Minor Occurrence Disposal for FTOs

The airline and FTO environments are very far apart. The days of a “one size fits all” safety reporting CAR are gone. Indeed, as explained earlier, overly stringent and expansive CARs have a regressive influence on safety reporting.  DGCA needs to make a separate safety occurrence reporting CAR for FTOs, bearing in mind the aircraft used and the operating environment. All inapplicable occurrences must be deleted, via a consultative process. Minor occurrences, especially tailskid strikes and tyre bursts with no other damage, should result in an immediate release of the aircraft by DGCA for rectification, after viewing photos and videos sent by the FTO safety staff. Corrective training for the crew involved, if any, should be in a standard pre-approved format, and a completion report from the FTO, with evidence,  should be the only requirement for them to resume flying duties. 

Safety Training Institutes and Training of Safety Operatives

There are at least 57 DGCA-approved institutes located across the country for the training of Aircraft Maintenance Engineers (AMEs).    There is, however, not a single approved Aviation Safety Training Institute in the country.  It is high time at least one is created by the Ministry of Civil Aviation. Like professional AMs, the need of the hour is to appoint professional, trained, SMs, and make Safety Management a mainstream occupation. All SMs of FTOs and even safety heads of other non-scheduled operators should mandatorily undergo a certificate course of  about three weeks, comprising SMS training, FDR Analysis, Risk Assessment, and Accident Investigation, at these institutes. The Operations Managers’ orientation capsule can also be conducted here. The mandate for the staff at these institutes can also include detailed analysis of accidents/ serious training incidents and dissemination of lessons learnt to FTOs. Once again, the plethora of senior or retired safety professionals across the military and civil sectors can be hired as faculty. 

Meaningful Safety Audits

Regulatory auditors need to be aware of the financial constraints under which FTOs operate, and moderate their expectations accordingly. Their energies should be directed towards the operators, who are at the cutting edge of safety. A detailed look at the quantity and quality of safety reports  is necessary; this will right away expose any trends of concealing occurrences and defects.  A test of safety knowledge of the pilots,  and a few backseat rides to evaluate the operational environment from the safety perspective, must form part of the audit checklist. Most importantly, and at the cost of repetition, auditors and the DGCA in general must bear in mind that the SM can only train and educate pilots in the right safety behaviour, and appraise them of  latest trends and safety regulations under which they operate. Eventually, the responsibility to exercise safe options lies with the administrative and operational leadership, instructors,  and other stakeholders.

FTO Accident/ Serious Incident Investigation Team Composition

Just as forensic accountants are used to audit a financial institution, or scientists to audit a research facility, specialists in operational Human Factors in FTOs – in other words, pilots with considerable instructional experience - need to be involved when investigating FTO accidents/ serious incidents. The AAIB would therefore be well-served by incorporating two steps:-

One, separating, to the extent possible,  its airline investigators from its FTO investigators; this may in any case soon be necessary,  because  500 training aircraft may be operating in Indian skies in a matter of a few years. 

Two,  hiring  experienced pilots/ safety professionals of both sexes with FTO backgrounds,  who can critically examine the Human Factors behind each accident. In case permanent employment is not possible, a pool of such professionals could be created,  and individuals hired on a contractual basis. An initiative on these lines was launched a few years ago, but what came of it is unknown.     These steps will ensure that the right questions are asked, and the Why? of each accident is reached, so that meaningful remedial measures are promptly enforced and repetitive accidents are avoided.

Stringent Quality Control- A Joint Effort

Candidates with low or even marginal knowledge or skill levels are  just not acceptable in a high-risk profession such as aviation. With FTOs being loath to suspend trainees for inability to reach acceptable standards in either ground subjects or flying, and regulators being unable to detect such cases,  effective mitigation of the associated risks can only be done by joint efforts. All FTOs should follow strict internal training review and suspension policies, which ensure that adequate opportunity is provided to a trainee to come up to the standard, but also do not permit untrainable or unsafe trainees to graduate. Regulatory auditors can validate the existence of these policies during audits, and query anomalies, such as the lack of a suspension for a long time. This will undoubtedly take a while, but commencing the process now is essential. However, three measures that can immediately be implemented by DGCA are: – 

A pause and review of the plan to remove the requirement of Physics and Maths in Class XII, until all FTOs and private coaching institutes provide their inputs. In case the plan is still approved, additional guardrails are strongly recommended, such as:- 

A longer ground training syllabus for Arts and Commerce students at FTOs, incorporating  a capsule of about 20 classes wherein Maths, Physics, and Chemistry concepts relevant to aviation are revised

A  regulatory online written test covering all subjects prior to the flying Skill Tests, with a passing mark of 70% 

A viva conducted by a team that includes the local CGI/ Ground SMEs, to ensure objectivity, prior to the Skill Tests 

Additionally, during inspection/ surveillance visits, DGCA inspectors should conduct random performance checks of students, irrespective of their having Science or non-Science backgrounds,  at the final stages of their flying/ ground training syllabus.  

Creating a regulation to impose a reasonable limit on the number of attempts to clear any theory paper (ideally, three, but no more than five), which can be recorded on eGCA. Beyond this, a candidate should be disbarred permanently. 

Setting up a monitoring system on eGCA to ensure that a trainee suspended for failure to learn flying in one FTO cannot enrol in another one, either in India or abroad.

More steps are possible, but given DGCA’s ongoing manning crisis,   it would be premature to elucidate them at this stage.

Comprehensive Flight Data Recorder Analysis and Training

With prevention being better than cure, in 2022, DGCA increased monitoring of FTOs and passed instructions for them to carry out FDR analysis of certain critical parameters in 25% of training flights.   This was a welcome move, but it could do with some modifications, such as:-

Increasing the sampling slowly to 100 %; 25% leaves too many flights unmonitored. 

Tackling the issue of flight path monitoring of legacy aircraft on priority.  About 60 legacy aircraft, comprising almost 20% of all training aircraft,  are still being used in FTOs, but are not  equipped with digital FDRs.   They need to be brought under the umbrella of FDR monitoring by DGCA. Other options, such as linking portable GPS units with ADS-B, need to be explored; this matter requires a deeper study. Time, however, is of the essence.

Creating a  standard format for FDR analysis. 

Enforcing/ ensuring formal training in FDR analysis for FTO safety staff. It is estimated that in over 90% cases, these analysts are short-term hires, who have been imparted informal training, or may even be self-trained.   This is again because no govt or private institution has been set up to impart such training. The remedy has been suggested above. 

More on this aspect will be covered in Part III of this study (Human Factors in the Environment).

Conclusion

Training is a vulnerable stage in the life of a pilot, far more than in other professions where risk to life and limb is absent or negligible. It needs to be  conducted in a safe operational environment,  and all FTOs promise the same on their websites and glossy brochures. Yet, as rising numbers of accidents show, safety is not being accorded its due in FTOs. The focus of this study has been on people, for, despite any amount of automation, modern tools, progressive policy-making, and detailed planning, it is they who matter the most. The fact is that the FTO industry is yet to make the transition from “safety vs production” to “safe production.” The obstacles on this path include legacy issues such as low institutional oversight on senior supervisors such as CFIs, who are getting younger by the day, a deeply entrenched policy of non-reporting of safety occurrences, harsh safety reporting regulations, remoteness of FTOs, and lack of in-depth inquiries into Human Factors’ accidents due to inadequately experienced and/ or trained regulatory staff. Modern problems include deficiencies in qualifications, expertise, and experience of AMs, parochial entities such as finance executives and Operations staff assuming a disproportionate say in the running of flight operations, competitive instincts overcoming prudent and safe decision-making, regulators playing catch-up rather than adopting a proactive approach on safety, untrained safety staff at FTOs,  all-round societal changes adversely affecting the younger generation, and FTOs departing from their role as institutions of learning, by overlooking breaches in student-teacher barriers, and not weeding out those who lack the aptitude, skillset, or attitude necessary to become safe aviators.   

The suggested remedies are more in the realm of attitudinal changes than anything else, and  do not entail any significant financial outlay or extensive policy changes. Specialised institutions such as FTOs should either be led by an experienced aviator with instructional experience, or a two-member team comprising one such aviator, and another from a related profession. A realisation has to dawn on owners that aviation training is closer to a service industry, than to a manufacturing one, and that expectations of profits have to be kept realistic. A lot has been said about the CFI’s role, but this is because of his/ her key position and immense responsibilities, and the downstream effects of his/her conduct; the fact is that all senior managers and flight operations supervisors must be trained and directed to ensure that the work-life environment at an FTO resembles that of a professional institute of learning, not that of a holiday resort on the road to a glamorous career. 

Veteran instructors must be hired as non-flying CFIs and FDR policies need to be tightened.  Quality control via professional and objective assessments is amongst the foremost duties of supervisors, and this must be conducted sincerely. Regulators and administrators need to close gaps in quality control processes,  not create new ones, especially in eligibility and academic standards. National aviation safety training institutes need to be set up on priority,  so that qualified and competent personnel are available to carry out safety oversight at FTOs. Finally, while appreciating some recent landmark regulatory changes, safety regulations must be further tweaked to rationalise reporting of safety occurrences by FTOs, while those who inspect these organisations need to be aware of their cultural environment and infrastructural limitations, and increase focus on line operators.

The author has focused on the major hazards created by human behaviour in the field of operations in FTOs. The solutions, too, lie in the same human beings, and the sooner they are implemented, the earlier would benefits accrue to the mushrooming FTO industry and Indian aviation in general.  Part II of the study, to be released soon,  will focus on the human element in Maintenance.

References

^[1] “Air India Air India firms up orders for 470 Airbus and Boeing Aircraft, signs purchase agreements at Paris Air Show,” Air India Press Release, 20 Jun 2023, https://www.airindia.com/in/en/newsroom/press-release/airbus-boeing-orders-confirmed.html

^[2] “IndiGo orders 500 Airbus A320 Family aircraft,” Posted on IndiGo Airlines website, 19 Jun 2023, https://www.goindigo.in/press-releases/indigo-orders-500-airbus-a320-family-aircraft.html

^[3] Table 10, pg. 18, DGCA Handbook on Civil Aviation Statistics, 2023-2024, https://public-prd-dgca.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/InventoryList/personal/training/pilot/flrTrainOrgs/flyclub.pdf

^[4] Ibid, Table 7, pg. 29. 

^[5] https://asn.flightsafety.org/wikibase/500782

^[6] Saraswat, Shivam, “Trainee aircraft collides with runway wall during landing in UP, pilot safe,” India Today online edition, 05 May 2025, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/trainee-aircraft-aligarh-crash-runway-wall-landing-up-pilot-safe-2719451-2025-05-04

^[7] Homepage of the Aero Club of India, https://www.aeroclubofindia.com

^[8] List of DGCA Approved Flying Training Organisations, https://public-prd-dgca.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/InventoryList/personal/training/pilot/flrTrainOrgs/flyclub.pdf

^[9] All inputs on US flying schools are kind courtesy Capt Patrick Murphy, veteran pilot, flight instructor, and leader of FTOs in India, China, and the US, via email to the author

^[10] “Boeing Announces Scholarships for Pilot Training,” Boeing Press Release, 24 Jul 2023, https://investors.boeing.com/investors/news/press-release-details/2023/Boeing-Announces-Scholarships-for-Pilot-Training/default.aspx

^[11] Singh, Nivedita, “ News 18,  15 Jun 2024, “18th Lok Sabha 'One for The Ages': India Gets Its 'Oldest Parliament' in History,” https://www.news18.com/india/18th-lok-sabha-one-for-the-ages-india-gets-its-oldest-parliament-in-history-8933012.html, The author quotes the Report of the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) on the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, available at https://adrindia.org/content/lok-sabha-elections-2024

^[12] All inputs on US flying schools are kind courtesy Capt Patrick Murphy, veteran pilot, flight instructor, and leader of FTOs in India, China, and the US, via email to the author

^[13] Barua, Antara, “India’s pilot training pipeline is broken. Crores spent, old aircraft, long wait for jobs,” The Print, 04 Mar 2025, https://theprint.in/ground-reports/indias-pilot-training-pipeline-is-broken-crores-spent-old-aircraft-long-wait-for-jobs/2527780/

^[14] Kautilya, “Arthashastra,” verse 267. Complete original verse in Sanskrit, “Raagye Dharmani Dharmishthaah Paape Paapaah Same Samaah Rajanamanuvartante Yathaa Raajaa tathaa Prajaa,” translated as ”Subjects follow their king: they are heathen if the king be irreligious; sinners if the king be a sinner and normal if their king be normal. As the king so the subjects.” https://www.projectulooka.com/post/yatha-raja-tatha-praja-arthashastra-267

^[15] DGCA Civil Aviation Requirements Section 5 - Air Safety Series 'C' Part I Issue II, 20th October 2015 and subsequently reviewed periodically, https://www.dgca.gov.in/digigov-portal/?dynamicPage=dynamicPdf/kZVV6f6uSq4sNTV2BhfLjA%3D%3D&maincivilAviationRequirements/6/0/viewDynamicRulesReqportal/?dynamicPage=dynamicPdf/kZVV6f6uSq4sNTV2BhfLjA%3D%3D&maincivilAviationRequirements/6/0/viewDynamicRulesReq

^[16] Patel, Deepak, “Sakthi, Diamond form joint venture to manufacture trainer aircraft in Hisar,” Business Standard, 12 Mar 2025, https://www.business-standard.com/external-affairs-defence-security/news/sakthi-diamond-form-joint-venture-to-manufacture-trainer-aircraft-in-hisar-125031100897_1.html

^[17]   Civil Aviation Requirements Section 7 – Flight Crew Standards Training & Licencing Series M Part II Issue IV, Dated 20th December 2021, “Flight Dispatcher Training and Approval”

^[18] “Two pilots killed as trainee aircraft crashes amid dense fog in Madhya Pradesh,” The New Indian Express, 04 Jan 2020, https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2020/Jan/04/two-pilots-killed-as-trainee-aircraft-crashes-amid-dense-fog-in-madhya-pradesh-2084716.html

^[19] Loiwal, Manogya, “Trainer aircraft crashes in Odisha's Dhenkanal, 2 killed,” India Today online edition, 08 Jun 2020, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/trainer-aircraft-crashes-odisha-s-dhenkanal-killed-1686665-2020-06-08

^[20] DGCA Flying Training Circular 1/ 2025, “Visibility Criterion for Flying Training Operations by FTOs,” 09 Feb 2025, https://www.dgca.gov.in/digigov-portal/?dynamicPage=dynamicPdf/%2B%2BO%2FTVgr7XnGsl%2B%2FQFBXRg%3D%3D&maincircularsRulesFlightCrewTraining/7/3325/viewDynamicRuleContLvl2

^[21] “The Role of Flight Instructors in Your Aviation Training Journey,” Darling Downs Aero Club, September 24, 2023, https://www.ddac.com.au/the-role-of-flight-instructors-in-your-aviation-training-journey

^[22] Bhardwaj, Amit, “Non-science students may soon be able to apply for pilot training in India,” India Today online edition, 26 May 2025, https://www.indiatoday.in/education-today/news/story/dgca-approves-pilot-training-access-for-arts-commerce-students-after-30-years-2730653-2025-05-26

^[23] Table on page 31, UDISE report of 2023-24 https://www.education.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/statistics-new/udise_report_existing_23_24.pdf

^[24] “25% of 14-18 age group in rural India struggle to read ‘grade 2’ text,” Fortune India, online edition, 18 Jan 2024, https://www.fortuneindia.com/macro/25-of-14-18-age-group-in-rural-india-struggle-to-read-grade-2-text/115449

^[25] “Helping students make right choice: DGCA directs flying schools to display data on website,” Times of India, online edition, 17 May 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/helping-students-make-right-choice-dgca-directs-flying-schools-to-display-data-on-website/articleshow/121240338.cms

^[26] Thapliyal, Arvind, “Déjà vu-Avoiding Repetitive Accidents in the Indian General Aviation Sector,” 100 Knots, Sep 2024, https://100knots.com/expert_speak-dj-vu-avoiding-repetitive-accidents-in-the-indian-general-aviation-sector-15#google_vignette

^[27] Safety Manager, https://skybrary.aero/articles/safety-manager#:~:text=According%20to%20ICAO%2C%20the%20operators,maintenance%20of%20an%20effective%20SMS%E2%80%9D.

^[28] DGCA Civil Aviation Requirements Section 7 – Flight Crew Standards Training & Licensing Series I Part V Issue II, Rev 8, 03 Jan 2025, “Criteria for approval of, Chief Flight Instructor, Designated Examiner

Deputy Chief Flight Instructor, Chief Ground Instructor and Non-Flying CFI for

Flying Training Organizations,” https://www.dgca.gov.in/digigov-portal/?dynamicPage=dynamicPdf/xs3RC6aY%2BIqsRpyRkuMsTA%3D%3D&maincivilAviationRequirements/6/0/viewDynamicRulesReq

^[29] Table 13, pg. 27, DGCA Handbook on Civil Aviation Statistics, 2023-2024 https://www.dgca.gov.in/digigov-portal/?page=jsp/dgca/InventoryList/dataReports/aviationDataStatistics/handbookCivilAviation/HANDBOOK%202023-24%20Final%20Draft.pdf&mainundefined

^[30] “DGCA, BCAS and AAI grapple with manpower shortage,” Deccan Herald, 07 Apr 2025, https://www.deccanherald.com/india/dgca-bcas-and-aai-grapple-with-manpower-shortage-3482019

Read more at: https://www.deccanherald.com/india/dgca-bcas-and-aai-grapple-with-manpower-shortage-3482019

^[31] DGCA Flying Training Circular 1 of 2022, “Monitoring of training in Flying Training Organization (sic) (FTO)” dated 22 Nov 2022, https://www.dgca.gov.in/digigov-portal/?dynamicPage=dynamicPdf/WYRobTP%2BjSSAXw5ii43hww%3D%3D&maincircularsRulesFlightCrewTraining/7/3325/viewDynamicRuleContLvl2

^[32] List of DGCA -Approved Flying Training Organisations as on 02 Dec 2024, https://public-prd-dgca.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/InventoryList/personal/training/pilot/flrTrainOrgs/flyclub.pdf